Indigent Legal Services
Decisions of Interest
MARCH 26, 2025

CRIMINAL

COURT OF APPEALS

People v Scott | March 19, 2025 (Rivera, J.)

INVOLUNTARY PLEA | PRESERVATION NOT REQUIRED | COURT'S SENTENCING ERROR | REVERSED | DISSENT

Appellant appealed from a Fourth Department order affirming his Erie County conviction of three counts of second-degree burglary, following his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed, with two judges dissenting, and remitted. Preservation of appellant's challenge to his plea was not required, because he had "no practical ability to object to an error . . . which is clear from the face of the record." The court's repeated statements to appellant that he faced up to 45 years in prison were legally erroneous on the face of the record, as the aggregate sentence was statutorily capped at 20 years. Appellant could not be expected to correct what the court authoritatively stated, and the prosecution and defense counsel mistakenly believed. The Court has "never held that defense counsel's failure" to "step in to correct" the court's error, "even if it provides a basis for a CPL [§] 440.10 motion, precludes a defendant from separately challenging on direct appeal the voluntariness of their plea due to the court's dereliction of its own constitutional duty." Under the totality of the circumstances, appellant's plea was involuntary: appellant was only 23 years old at that time, had no comparable experience facing serious charges, was under immense pressure to decide whether to accept the plea offer, and the court's egregious error left him with little to no choice. Judge Singas, joined by Judge Garcia, would have affirmed, "because defense counsel plainly had the requisite practical opportunity to raise [the claim] before the trial court." The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc. (Nicholas P. DiFonzo, of counsel) represented Scott.
People v Scott (2025 NY Slip Op 01562)
Oral Argument

People v Padilla-Zuniga | March 19, 2025 (Memorandum)

INVOLUNTARY PLEA | PRESERVATION NOT REQUIRED | MANDATORY FINES | REVERSED & REMITTED

Appellant appealed from a Second Department order affirming his Nassau County conviction of first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, aggravated driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, following his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the plea, and remitted. The court's failure to inform appellant at the time of his plea that the sentences for two of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty included mandatory fines rendered the plea involuntary.

Preservation was not required where appellant had no practical ability to object prior to the imposition of the fines, which the court did not mention until imposition of sentence. Nor can a valid appeal waiver preclude a challenge to an involuntary plea "where the court fails to advise…of a component of th[e] sentence before it is imposed." Judge Singas took no part in the decision; Justice Webber, from the First Department, sat on the panel by designation. The Legal Aid Society of Nassau County (Argun Ulgen, of counsel) represented Padilla-Zuniga.
[People v Padilla-Zuniga (2025 NY Slip Op 01563)]
[Oral Argument]

People v Moss | March 20, 2025 (Singas, J.)

SORA | PRESUMPTIVE OVERRIDE | AFFIRMED

Appellant appealed from a Fourth Department order affirming the SORA court's decision to apply an automatic override and designate appellant as a level three sexually violent predicate sex offender based on a prior 2006 conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed and agreed that the automatic override applies. Appellant had successfully challenged the constitutionality of his 2006 plea in an intervening resentencing proceeding, where a court found it could not serve as a predicate because the guilty plea had been unconstitutionally obtained based on the sentencing court's threats to issue the maximum sentence if he proceeded to trial. But appellant never challenged the 2006 conviction on direct appeal (his notice of appeal was deemed untimely and he was denied permission to file a late notice of appeal under CPL § 460.30), and he never sought vacatur pursuant to CPL § 440.10. The Court emphasized the different evidentiary standards involved: a constitutional challenge to a predicate for sentencing enhancement purposes requires substantial evidence, a lower burden of proof than on direct appeal ("totality of the circumstances" review of the plea's involuntariness) or via 440 (preponderance of the evidence). Without vacatur of the 2006 conviction, the override applies. Alternatively, appellant could have sought a downward departure on the basis of the resentencing court's finding regarding the predicate, but he failed to do so.
[People v Moss (2025 NY Slip Op 01673)]
[Oral Argument]

APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

People v Gonzalez | March 18, 2025

ORDER OF PROTECTION | FAILURE TO CREDIT JAIL TIME | INTEREST OF JUSTICE | REMANDED

Appellant appealed from a New York County Supreme Court judgment convicting him of first-degree criminal contempt. The First Department remanded for recalculation of the order of protection, reaching the unpreserved claim in the interest of justice. The prosecution conceded that the expiration date of the OOP was incorrect because it failed to account for the jail time credit to which appellant was entitled. The Legal Aid Society of NYC (Ji Hyun Rhim, of counsel) represented Gonzalez.
[People v Gonzalez (2025 NY Slip Op 01587)]

People v Hernandez | March 18, 2025

JUROR MISCONDUCT | 330.30 HEARING ORDERED | HELD IN ABEYANCE & REMANDED

Appellant appealed from a Bronx County Supreme Court judgment convicting him, after a jury trial, of first-degree burglary and third-degree criminal mischief and sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of 6 years and 1 to 3 years, respectively. The First Department held the appeal in abeyance and remanded for a CPL § 330.30 hearing. Summary denial of a 330.30 motion is only appropriate when the motion lacks a legal basis or contains no sworn factual allegations essential to support it (CPL § 330.30[2][d][iii]). Here, two jurors attested that another juror—an attorney—stated during deliberations that "the proof did not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on these sworn allegations, even where appellant was acquitted of the top charges. The First Department also affirmed summary denial of a DVSJA hearing pursuant to PL § 60.12, holding that appellant had failed to put forth evidence of a temporal nexus between the alleged abuse and offense. The court cited *People v Williams*, 198 AD3d 466 (1st Dept 2021), a case involving a resentencing claim under CPL § 440.47, which does have an evidentiary pleading requirement, where the absence of a temporal nexus was determined only after an evidentiary hearing. The First Department cited no statutory support for requiring a pre-hearing evidentiary proffer under PL § 60.12. Edelstein & Grossman (Jonathan I. Edelstein, of counsel) represented Hernandez.
[People v Hernandez (2025 NY Slip Op 01589)]
[Oral Argument (starts at 02:46:40)]

People v Bonilla | March 20, 2025

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER | DETERMINATION NEEDED | REMANDED

Appellant appealed from a Bronx County Supreme Court judgment convicting him of fourth-degree promoting prostitution and obstruction of breath or blood circulation. The First Department remanded for resentencing for the court to determine on the record appellant's entitlement to youthful offender treatment. Office of the Appellate Defender (Alexandra Ricks, of counsel) represented Bonilla.
[People v Bonilla (2025 NY Slip Op 01722)]
[Oral Argument (starts at 00:05:48)]

People v Harris | March 20, 2025

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER | DETERMINATION NEEDED | MITIGATING FACTORS | REMANDED

Appellant appealed from two New York County Supreme Court judgments convicting him of attempted first-degree assault, attempted second-degree murder, and second-degree CPW. The First Department remanded for resentencing in both cases. The prosecution conceded that appellant was entitled to resentencing on the armed felonies of attempted assault and CPW. While not presumptively eligible for youthful offender treatment, appellant was entitled to a determination as to the applicability of mitigating factors. As to the second-degree murder conviction, appellant was YO-eligible without any presumption of ineligibility and was entitled to an express determination of the propriety of youthful offender status on that charge. The Legal Aid Society of NYC (David Billingsley, of counsel) represented Harris.
[People v Harris (2025 NY Slip Op 01718)]

People v Rochester | March 20, 2025

APPEAL WAIVER INVALID | INSUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF APPELLATE RIGHTS | AFFIRMED

Appellant appealed from a Bronx County Supreme Court judgment convicting him, upon a guilty plea, of third-degree CPCS and criminal possession of a firearm (Greenberg, J.). The First Department struck down the appeal waiver but otherwise affirmed. The plea court conducted no review of the appellate rights being waived to establish that appellant had a full appreciation of the waiver's consequences, even considering the written waiver, which was itself faulty. The plea court did not explain that the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial rights forfeited by pleading guilty or that waiver was not an absolute bar to appeal, as some claims were unwaivable. The Legal Aid Society of NYC (Lorraine Maddalo, of counsel) represented Rochester.
People v Rochester (2025 NY Slip Op 01720)

APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT

People v Vassell | March 19, 2025

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE | SEX OFFENSES | MODIFIED

Appellant appealed from a Kings County Supreme Court judgment convicting him of first-degree criminal sexual act (6 counts), first-degree sexual abuse (16 counts), first-degree incest (6 counts), among other counts, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, on each count to a determinate term of 15 years' imprisonment followed by 20 years' PRS, with five separate groups of counts running consecutively to each other. The Second Department modified, in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence on each count to a determinate term of 8 years' imprisonment followed by 20 years' PRS, and otherwise affirmed. Appellate Advocates (Erica Horwitz, of counsel) represented Vassell.
People v Vassell (2025 NY Slip Op 01650)
Oral Argument (starts at 00:08:20)

People v Vega | March 19, 2025

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE | FIRST-DEGREE ASSAULT AFTER TRIAL | MODIFIED

Appellant appealed from a Kings County Supreme Court judgment convicting him of first-degree assault, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him as a second violent felony offender to a determinate term of 18 years' imprisonment followed by 5 years' PRS. The Second Department modified, in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence to a determinate term of 14 years' imprisonment followed by 5 years' PRS, and otherwise affirmed. The underlying trial involved acquittal on a charge of second-degree attempted murder on grounds other than justification, as stated by the jury foreperson, and a denied request for a justification charge on the assault count of which appellant was convicted. Appellate Advocates (Anna Jouravleva, of counsel) represented Vega.
People v Vega (2025 NY Slip Op 01651)
Oral Argument (starts at 00:07:35)

People v Brown | March 19, 2025

DEFICIENT *ANDERS* BRIEF | NEW COUNSEL ASSIGNED

Appellant appealed from a Suffolk County Court judgment convicting her of second-degree attempted robbery, following her guilty plea. Assigned counsel filed an *Anders* brief to withdraw. The Second Department found counsel's brief deficient, granted leave

to withdraw, and assigned new counsel. Although the brief identified several appealable issues, counsel's conclusion that such issues are meritless converted his constitutionally mandated role to act as an "active advocate" on his client's behalf into "merely an advisor to the court on the merits of the appeal."
[People v Brown (2025 NY Slip Op 01639)]

APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT

People v Bender | March 20, 2025

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY | DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE | AFFIRMED | DISSENT

Appellant appealed from an Albany County Court judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless endangerment and from an order of the same court summarily denying his CPL § 440.10 motion. The Third Department affirmed. The evidence sufficiently demonstrated that appellant "recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death to others, with an utter disregard for whether any harm came to those [ ]he imperiled." Eyewitness testimony indicated that appellant drove indiscriminately along a busy road and "played an extreme game of bumper cars" with nearby drivers. Appellant never stopped or pulled over after colliding with other vehicles and continued driving until his vehicle crashed into a house. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that he acted with depraved indifference to human life, an essential element of first-degree reckless endangerment. Justice Clark in dissent would have reduced appellant's conviction to second-degree reckless endangerment and remitted the matter for resentencing, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to show that appellant was aware of, appreciated, and disregarded the risks caused by his behavior. Throughout the five-minute ordeal spanning less than half a mile, there was no evidence that appellant was speeding, ever drove against oncoming traffic, or failed to obey traffic lights. Powers & Santola, LLP (Michael J. Hutter, of counsel) represented Bender.
[People v Bender (2025 NY Slip Op 01678)]
[Oral Argument]

People v Phelps | March 20, 2025

CPL §§ 440.10 & 440.20 | DISCRETIONARY BAR INAPPLICABLE | REMITTED FOR HEARING

Appellant appealed from a Montgomery County Court order denying his second CPL § 440.10 and 440.20 motion, without a hearing. The Third Department reversed the order in the interest of justice and remitted the matter to County Court for a hearing. In his first 440 motion, which was summarily denied, appellant argued that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because counsel misadvised him about when he would become eligible for parole if he accepted the plea offer. Appellant raised the issue again in his second 440 motion, which was again summarily denied on the theory that his successive claim was procedurally barred. The Third Department held that, while CPL § 440 does not obligate a court to evaluate a prior ruling on the merits before summarily denying a subsequent motion advancing the same issue, that bar is discretionary rather than mandatory. This case presents one of the rare times when it is appropriate to reconsider issues previously decided on the merits. Critically, the second motion included witness affidavits affirming that counsel assured appellant that he would be eligible for parole halfway through his minimum 15-year term of imprisonment, as well

as correspondence between counsel and appellant wherein counsel ignored questions on the topic. Given appellant's submissions, plus his relatively young age and inexperience with the criminal legal system, summary denial of his motion was an improvident exercise of discretion. Adam W. Toraya represented Phelps.
[People v Phelps (2025 NY Slip Op 01680)]

APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT

People v Iqbal | March 21, 2015

STRANGULATION | PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT UNRELATED CASES | REVERSED

Appellant appealed from a Monroe County Court judgment convicting him of third-degree assault and second-degree strangulation. The Fourth Department reversed. County Court erred when it permitted a police officer to testify about prior unrelated cases involving alleged strangulations where he did not recall observing bruises on the complainants during his investigations. The testimony, which was used by the prosecution to explain the lack of bruising on the complainant's neck in this case, was highly prejudicial and entirely irrelevant. The Monroe County Public Defender's Office (James Eckert, of counsel) represented Iqbal.
[People v Iqbal (2025 NY Slip Op 01746)]
[Oral Argument]

People v Meyers | March 21, 2025

RECONSTRUCTION HEARING | AFFIRMED | DISSENT

Appellant appealed from a Steuben County Court judgment convicting him of first-degree arson and first-degree murder. The Fourth Department affirmed, with the Presiding Justice dissenting. Upon an earlier appeal from the conviction, the Fourth Department remitted for a reconstruction hearing, since large portions of the record were missing, including: "three days of jury selection, opening statements, summations, final jury instructions, County Court's handling of a jury note, and the verdict," as well as portions of witnesses' testimony replaced with irregularities like "omitted," "untranscribable," and "blah blah." Following a reconstruction hearing and second appeal, the Fourth Department affirmed the conviction. Presiding Justice Whalen would have reversed and granted a new trial based on the inadequate procedures at the reconstruction hearing. County Court did not specifically list the transcripts to be reconstructed, nor did it determine whether the evidence submitted was sufficient to construct a record that would protect the right to appeal. The prosecution also refused to provide defense counsel with copies of or access to the original trial exhibits, and County Court's denial of the defense's motion for those items deprived appellant of the right to a fair hearing.
[People v Meyers (2025 NY Slip Op 01762)]

People v Nateonna R. | March 21, 2025

DVSJA | INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT ABUSE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR | AFFIRMED

Appellant appealed from an Erie County Supreme Court judgment convicting her of first-degree manslaughter after a plea and denying her relief under the DVSJA at initial sentencing under PL § 60.12. The Fourth Department affirmed. Assuming that the appeal

waiver did not encompass denial of DVSJA sentencing, the court reached the merits of the DVSJA claim, holding that the defense failed to establish that the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the criminal conduct.
[People v Nateonna R. (2025 NY Slip Op 01757)](#)
[Oral Argument](#)

People v Linda R.M. | March 21, 2025

DVSJA | FAILURE TO REQUEST 60.12 HEARING NOT IAC | AFFIRMED

Appellant appealed from a Wayne County Court judgment convicting her of first-degree manslaughter after a plea. The Fourth Department affirmed. Defense counsel's failure to request a hearing to determine eligibility for an alternative sentence at initial sentencing under the DVSJA, was not ineffective assistance. The record reflected that, as part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a sentence commensurate to what appellant could have received under the DVSJA. The court noted that, to the extent appellant alleged IAC regarding the plea negotiation, that claim must be raised via CPL § 440 motion.
[People v Linda R.M. (2025 NY Slip Op 01755)](#)
[Oral Argument](#)

TRIAL COURTS

People v Aron | 2025 WL 796159

SPEEDY TRIAL | COC/SOR ILLUSORY | LACK OF DUE DILIGENCE TO OBTAIN IAB LOGS | DISMISSED

Aron moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. New York County Criminal Court granted the motion. The prosecution's COC was invalid and their statement of readiness illusory because they failed to exercise due diligence to obtain and disclose the IAB logs for testifying and non-testifying police officers. Disciplinary records of police officers involved in a case always relate to the subject matter as potential impeachment. As to the IAB log for the testifying officer, the prosecution did not perform their initial discovery obligations until 84 days from arraignment, when the speedy trial period had nearly expired, suggesting a lack of due diligence. Moreover, the prosecution did not provide the court with any details as to why the log was not discovered upon their initial request. As to the IAB logs for non-testifying officers, the prosecution incorrectly claimed that these records were not automatically discoverable. The prosecution is required to make attempts to determine whether non-testifying officers' disciplinary records fall into one of the enumerated categories in CPL 245.20(1)(k). Here, the prosecution did not indicate any steps taken to obtain the disciplinary records of non-testifying officers involved in the case and thus failed to meet their burden to show that they exercised due diligence. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (Eliel A. Talo, of counsel) represented Aron.
[People v Aron (2025 NY Slip Op 50319(U))](#)

People v Honciuc | 2025 WL 828071

ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT | FACIALLY INSUFFICIENT | DISMISSED

Honciuc moved to dismiss an information charging him with second-degree aggravated harassment as facially insufficient. Queens County Criminal Court granted the motion and dismissed. The prosecutor relied on an outdated version of PL § 240.30, which the Court of Appeals invalidated as unconstitutional in *People v Golb*, 23 NY3d 455 [2014]. The

current statute criminalizes communication that conveys “a threat to cause physical harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of” another person. The statements in the information included: “I hope you kill yourself,” “I hope you die,” “I hope you drown,” and “kill yourself, you f[******] bitch.” While these messages were efforts to insult and degrade the complainant, they are not threats because they do not warn any sort of future harm. Eric Shapiro Renfroe represented Honciuc.
[People v Honciuc (2025 NY Slip Op 50330(U))]

People v Lara | 2025 WL 795950

SPEEDY TRIAL | COR INVALID | DISMISSED

Lara moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. New York County Criminal Court granted the motion and dismissed. The prosecution was not ready for trial within 90 days from the commencement of the misdemeanor action because they filed a COC and COR via the New York State Unified Court System’s Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS) at 7:00 pm, 90 days after arraignment. This rendered the COR invalid for two reasons. First, EDDS is not “open court,” nor is it the equivalent of an in-person filing with a court clerk. Thus, it did not satisfy the requirement that there be a communication of readiness by the prosecution that appears on the trial court’s record. Per the EDDS homepage, “a document sent through [EDDS] should be treated as ‘filed’ only upon receipt of notice from the court clerk or County Clerk . . . that the document has been accepted for filing.” It is impossible for a document uploaded after the clerk’s office is closed to formally become part of the record the same day. Second, a statement of readiness for a trial that cannot happen because courts are closed is meaningless and cannot stop the speedy trial clock. The Legal Aid Society of NYC (Edda Ness, of counsel) represented Lara.
[People v Lara (2025 NY Slip Op 50320(U))]

People v Perryman | 2025 WL 812264

SPEEDY TRIAL | ORAL WAIVER INSUFFICIENT | DISMISSED

Perryman moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Genesee County Court granted the motion. The prosecutor’s argument that defense counsel orally waived Perryman’s speedy trial rights during plea negotiations was insufficient to establish that the disputed time period was chargeable to the defense. Although the accused may waive their rights under CPL § 30.30, such waiver must be explicit, and “mere silence is not a waiver.” Here, nothing in the record suggested that Perryman was aware of or ever consented to the adjournment, and there was no clear written waiver of speedy trial. Moreover, defense counsel passed away before the case was presented to the Grand Jury and was unable to address the prosecutor’s claims. Terence McCarty represented Perryman.
[People v Perryman (2025 NY Slip Op 50322(U))]

FAMILY

APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Matter of La. J. (L.J.) | March 18, 2025

NEGLECT | ALCOHOL MISUSE | MODIFIED

Parent appealed from a Bronx County Family Court order finding that she neglected the child based on alcohol use and educational neglect. The First Department modified by vacating the finding based on alcohol use and otherwise affirmed. While there was testimony that the parent behaved inappropriately on at least two occasions, there was insufficient proof that she was intoxicated at the time. Daniel X. Robinson represented the parent.

Matter of La. J. (L.J.) (2025 NY Slip Op 01575)

Matter of D.C. v J.J.G. | March 20, 2025

FAMILY OFFENSE | DISORDERLY CONDUCT | NOT MOOT DESPITE EXPIRED OOP | MODIFIED

Appellant appealed from a New York County Family Court order finding that he committed the family offenses of second-degree harassment and disorderly conduct and issuing a two-year order of protection. The First Department modified by vacating the disorderly conduct finding and otherwise affirmed. The appeal was not moot, although the order of protection had expired, because the family offense finding carries enduring consequences. Evidence that appellant sent private messages to the other party via Facebook messenger did not support a finding that he acted with “the intent to cause, or recklessness in causing, public harm,” a requirement for a finding of disorderly conduct. Marion C. Perry represented appellant.

Matter of D.C. v J.J.G. (2025 NY Slip Op 01710)

APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT

Matter of Jose M.F. | March 21, 2025

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY| MAKING A TERRORISTIC THREAT | LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT | REVERSED

Appellant appealed from a Seneca County Family Court order finding that he had committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of making a terroristic threat, and placing him in the custody of OCFS for 18 months. The Fourth Department reversed and dismissed the petition. Appellant sent messages to a student in a different school district that he was planning to commit a mass shooting to end bullying at his school. This was legally insufficient to establish that he made a terroristic threat, which requires “intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” There was no evidence that the threat was made to anyone other than the singular student, nor a request that the threat be conveyed to others. Deborah K. Jessey represented appellant.

Matter of Jose M.F. (2025 NY Slip Op 01734)

Matter of Passero v Patcyk | March 21, 2025

VISITATION | PROHIBITION ON VISITS IN FATHER’S HOME | REVERSED

Father appealed from an Erie County Family Court order prohibiting him from exercising visitation with the children at his residence. The Fourth Department reversed. The order lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record. Although two of the three children were allergic to horses, which the father had on his property, there was insufficient evidence that the children could not safely visit if precautions were taken. The mother’s medical expert’s opinion—that the children must strictly avoid horse allergens—was

based on inaccurate information that the children were taken to urgent care as the result of an allergic reaction to horses. Caitlin M. Connelly represented the father.
Matter of Passero v Patcyk (2025 NY Slip Op 01754)
Oral Argument

Matter of Seeley-Sick v Allison | March 21, 2025

VISITATION | IMPROPER CONDITION | MODIFIED AND REMITTED

Mother appealed from a Livingston County Family Court order that, among other things, ordered that the father was not required to permit visitation between her and the children until she completed domestic violence counseling or no longer resides with her husband. The Fourth Department modified by vacating that provision and remitted to Family Court for the court to fashion a specific schedule "for visitation, if any" between the mother and children. Family Court erred by conditioning visitation on parental conduct. Caitlin M. Connelly represented the mother.
Matter of Seeley-Sick v Allison (2025 NY Slip Op 01747)
Oral Argument

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